Tuesday, January 9, 2007
In Iraq Bush has the urge to surge – 3 years too late
More troops will help but it shows that fighting war ‘on the cheap’ is actually more expensive.
by Ferdinand III
When fighting a war you win through overwhelming strength, securing the objectives, and restoring civil life through an occupational government. The occupational government as a matter of common sense and good politics will incorporate local leaders – of all varieties and ideologies. Yet crucially the occupation must clearly and ruthlessly state and protect its goals. This never occurred in Iraq with disastrous results.
In Iraq the goals of invasion and occupation were and are laudable: destroy a nexus of terrorism, derange terrorist financing; defang a regional threat in Hussein; secure our oil supplies; thwart Iranian hegemonic aspirations; and begin the long, slow process of reform in a failed, fascist and pagan part of the world. While important these goals were never expressed by the Bush administration to the US public and they never informed the tenor and details of the Iraq occupation. The American military in Iraq for whatever reason, did almost the opposite of what was necessary after deposing the Hussein government.
To secure a military occupation peace and security are essential. In fighting terrorists, fascists, jihadists and gangs, the creation of a democratic and transparent government while good for PR is not the main priority. Destroying opposition should have been the main preoccupation of US forces. To achieve security the US had to do four key things within the first few months of the occupation: find and kill Hussein; kill any and all jihadist and terrorist leaders; secure the borders; and secure Baghdad. They failed in all areas.
Future military historians will view the second Iraqi war as an unnecessary and prolonged affair because the Americans fell into the trap of ‘fighting wars on the cheap’. In doing so they ensured that they had too few troops, no clear objectives, and a utopian view that once Hussein was gone the country would turn docile. Without focusing on the four key objectives listed above the Americans guaranteed themselves that the conflict would escalate, last far longer than necessary and cost far more in blood and treasure then if the war and occupation had been done properly.
This misreading of military and regional history is the crux of the American problem in Iraq. You don’t fight wars in Iraq ignoring for example, the history of 2 failed British occupations of the country from 1918-1932 and from 1940-1945. In both cases 15.000 British Empire soldiers and the RAF tried to control a large country, riven by ideological, tribal, and familial conflict. The British backed regimes were engaged in endless sectarian conflict – reminiscent of what is occurring today. The country was never stable during the British interregnum and public opinion in England forced the British to leave Iraq – twice – and in both cases murderous Sunni-based dictatorships were erected. The British war on the cheap in Iraq should have served as a cautionary principle for the Americans. They ignored the lessons.
Blaming Iraqi violence on the British artificially creating an unnatural state is terribly misinformed. Carnage in the Iraqi area has a long and glorious history pre-dating Western involvement. In most current polls the vast majority of Iraqis want a federal and unified Iraqi state. Borders are not the issue. The problem is fighting a conflict cheaply. As anyone knows doing something in the short term cheaply to save money, oftentimes means a longer term cost that is more painful and difficult to bear.
The lack of US will power and force has however, given impulse to the opposite forces that the US intended to create. Arab leaders are now fretting over the possibility of a regional war as Iraq self destructs into three separate Shia, Sunni and Kurdish areas. The most foolish option would be to partition Iraq into 3 countries. This will indeed foment a regional war. Jordan, Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Iran will all invade parts of Iraq to claim their spoils and oil – all under the rhetoric of ‘aiding our brethren and brothers’. It is vital that the US stay in Iraq and unfiy the state in some sort of confederation - however difficult and tenuous.
Bush’s urge to surge 20.000 more troops is necessary – but 3 years too late. In this conflict US reaction to many events has been slow – especially the need to secure the borders, Baghdad and create a feeling of security in the country which is the premise of civil society. Bush’s surge can work in destroying violence in Baghdad – the question is not whether to do it, but why was it not done 3 years ago?